A Brisbane survey was conducted to examine some of the consequences of Centrelink breach penalties when applied to unemployment welfare recipients under the Howard Coalition Government's ideology of Mutual Obligation.
Introduction
The large majority of people who receive breach penalties from Centrelink are unemployed, in receipt of welfare payments under either the New Start Allowance program or the Youth Allowance program. These programs include Activity Test conditions with which beneficiaries must comply in order to avoid incurring breach penalties. Central to the whole issue of breaching is the political ideology of Mutual Obligation (Kinnear 2000) and entrenched high levels of long-term unemployment (Borland 2000) . 
Background to the ascendancy of Mutual Obligation
Central to discussion of Australia's income support welfare system is an understanding of the importance of increasingly higher levels of long term unemployment (Edwards et al. 2001) and the now entrenched political ideology of Mutual Obligation with its coercive breach penalty system (Hartman 2001) .
In 1974 the Australian rate of unemployment was less than 3 per cent (Watts 2001: 3) . The economic upturns in the late 1980's and late 1990's were not enough to restore that low unemployment level, the best achieved was 5.4 per cent in November 1989 (Borland 2000: 1) .
In September 2003 unemployment stood officially at 5.8 per cent (ABS 2003a).
However, when under-employed people, discouraged job-seekers and disguised unemployed people are taken into account, the 'real level of unemployment' is in the order of 12 to 18 per cent of the working age population (Tomlinson 2003: 1) . Carlson and Mitchell (2002: 50) calculated that Australia 'now wastes over 12 per cent of its available labour resources'.
With high unemployment levels came a rise in the number of people who are long-term unemployed. Burgess et al. (1998: 3) reported the average duration of unemployment 'rose from three weeks in 1966…to 50.5 weeks in 1998'. The 'one-year' long-term unemployed now runs at 57 per cent of all benefit recipients (Saunders & Tsumori 2003: 3) . However, of over 600,000 people currently receiving unemployment benefits, Ziguras et al. (2003) It should be remembered that governments, when blaming and disciplining those who fail to meet their obligations of finding work, have shifted the accent 'from one of a lack of employment to a problem with unemployed individuals' Lauritsen (2001: 13-14) . This oft-used form of blaming 'dole-bludgers' is well understood (Watts 2001: 5) because 'blaming the victim allows policy makers to absolve themselves from responsibility' and obviates the need to provide full employment (Hartman 2001: 3-4) .
The introduction of Mutual Obligation
Mutual Obligation policy was introduced in 1997. Prime Minister Howard asserted that his Government should assist those in genuine need. He also noted 'it is the case that -to the extent that it is within their capacity to do so -those in receipt of such assistance should give something back to society in return, and in the process improve their own prospects for self-reliance' (Howard 1999: 10) .
The Coalition Government follows, according to Prime Minister Howard, 'a mix in public policy which combines liberalisation in economic policy and what I would describe as a "modern conservatism" in social policy' (Howard 1999, p.3) . Combined with a belief in the efficiency of private enterprise and an acceptance of the demands of globalisation, this dry neo-liberal economic fundamentalist (there is nothing 'rational' about it) welfare agenda underpins perceptions that rational individuals readily respond to monetary incentives and disincentives (Donald 2000) .
Consequently, Australia's categorical Social Security system is now based on the traditional Lockean Protestant work ethic, which holds that one should not receive 'something for nothing'. The system increasingly seeks to coerce specified welfare recipients to engage in mandatory 'activities' under the ideology of Mutual Obligation (Burgess et al. 1998 : 7) so that they may 'give something back'. Such targeting of unemployed welfare recipients has been popularly accepted as being fair and ethical.
'Giving something back' to society would be compulsory and could include specified volunteer work, approved study, participation in Work for the Dole programs or prescribed job-search activities. Compulsory job-seeker diaries and interviews, Activity Tests and punitive 'breaching' systems were implemented to coerce people to give something back. The second reading for the Social Security Amendment Bill, legalising the Mutual Obligation breaching regime, outlined the main objective 'to maintain a strong deterrence for failure to meet reasonable requirements' (Moses & Sharples 2000: 4) .
However implementation has also meant that unemployed people are subjected to more surveillance, duties, and punitive measures than before. Unemployment payments are no longer a right 'but were now made conditional upon participation in employment programs ' (Burgess et al. 2000: 174-186 Increasing the number of hoops through which a welfare recipient must jump results in disincentive, so that some people leave the system even when fully eligible to receive payment (Goodin 2001) . Moses and Sharples (2000: 17) reported that for a 'very conservative 27% [of recipients] the system just becomes too hard and that they turn instead to relatives, the welfare sector or crime for support'.
Government expectations for the Mutual Obligation breaching regime
The Howard Government expected that rigorous application of compulsory activity test requirements would coerce active job search (Moses & Sharples 2000: 4) and 'make it harder for people to choose welfare over work' (Jackman 2002: 5) . At the same time, under Mutual Obligation ideology, coercive practices are expected to enhance the chances of people finding work (Richardson 2000) .
Under a robust compliance regime, people who received a breach penalty would be motivated to 'comply' with activity tests and thus avoid further breaches at increasing penalty rates. At the same time the pressure would ensure that unemployed people would actively seek work and move 'off-benefit' quickly (DEWRSB 2001: 11) . As the Commonwealth Productivity Commission put it;
'a breaching regime is an important part of ensuring that unemployment beneficiaries seriously engage in job search or measures that improve their employability' (CPC 2002: S6, 17) . Government instructed Centrelink to increase compliance surveillance and to contractually pressure Job Network members to increase breach recommendations by setting target quotas for breaches (Ombudsman 2002; Pearce et al. 2002) .
The Government expected that recipients should accept active and compulsory job search as 'normal' and 'useful' components of 'reasonable' job-seeker responsibilities (Newman 2000 Questions were asked about reasons for, or the lack of explanation given when breached, perceived fairness, perceived pressures to leave welfare benefit programs, perceived pressures to search harder for work, knowledge of (and use of) systems of appeal. Further questions were asked as to whether notice of an impending breach was given, any consequent increase or decrease in selfesteem, any improvement in job prospects and was there greater or lesser future intention to comply with Centrelink requirements? A final question asked if accommodation was changed as a consequence of having received a breach penalty, was it equally desirable, less desirable or 'other'?
The use of one standard survey form, collected from three separate locations, does assist reliability and validity (Hammersley 1992) . Data collection took place during 6 days in April 2002. The author took up a position on the public footpath directly in front of three Centrelink branch offices at Mitchelton, Chermside and Nundah, located in the northern areas of urban Brisbane.
Members of the public in the vicinity of these branches could see a large (size A1) sign either side of the author's small table. The signs invited participation in the survey for people who had been breached and were over 18 years old.
Because the author met the survey respondents, liased with various authorities and conducted correspondence, meetings and discussions with a variety of Centrelink Managers to facilitate the survey, it is appropriate that this additional 'field data' was also included to broaden the study insights (Babbie 1995: 280) .
For example, some comments made by various Centrelink managers exhibited attitudinal thinking reflective of the ideological rhetoric used by the Howard Government discussed earlier.
At Mitchelton, it was apparent to the author that Centrelink staff had not been alerted about the survey activity because staff exhibited obvious interest, curiosity and concern. A supervisor challenged the researcher with the comment that 'no one else was game to approach you'. Accepting a copy of the survey instrument and various supporting documents, the supervisor advised that the Commonwealth had 'move on' powers, however a senior manager from Central
Office was presently 'coming out' to assess the situation.
The Brisbane Area Business Manager duly arrived, having been briefed by the supervisor. Interestingly, she stated that her initial advice indicated there was protest activity involving placards taking place. She expressed surprise that upon arrival, she could only see 'one individual, standing at a small table under a tree, like at those polling booths'. Her major concerns were that there should be no placards, protests or press gatherings.
Similar concerns exhibited by other Centrelink personnel in communications with the author suggested that an elevated level of awareness and understanding does exist about the controversial nature of Mutual Obligation breaching policies. Concern was often expressed that public protest activity could readily erupt, creating 'political problems' for Centrelink.
One manager expressed concern about what form the survey might take, explaining 'this Centrelink office is one of multiple tenancies in this complex, and a very unpopular one, because of the nature of our customers, as you would understand'. That 'nature' was understood by the author to mean unpleasant, poorly behaved deviant people of low social acceptability and standing.
The Nundah Branch Manager confirmed awareness of the survey, explaining that Canberra and Queensland management had directed that this survey could proceed, provided compliance with Centrelink's national guidelines for the management of 'customer behavior' were maintained. Tellingly, she had been told that this author was 'benign and friendly'!
Some limitations of the research
It needs to be recognised that some weaknesses of the survey approach used include the fact that the emphasis of the survey is on individuals who have been breached, and there is no control or comparison group of unemployed people who have not been breached. Thus the information cannot be generalised for use in a broader context. However some conclusions can be drawn about the experiences of the surveyed group.
Findings of this survey on Government expectations relative to Mutual

Obligation policy
From the 56 people who completed the survey, some response figures stood out:
• 95% of respondents (53 people) thought that, when they were breached, Centrelink was being unfair to them.
• 93% of respondents (52 people) felt their self-esteem had decreased after being breached. Many felt that Centrelink had put pressure on them to go 'off-benefit' permanently.
• 91% of respondents (51 people) did not realise beforehand, that they were about to be breached. This suggested Centrelink exhibited a lack of concern about customer rights, due process and procedural fairness. The
Ombudsman's inquiry drew a similar conclusion a year earlier (McLeod 2001) .
• 73% of respondents (41 people) believed that they were not more likely to get paid work because of any Centrelink compulsory activity undertaken, which suggests the requirements were viewed as unrealistic and unreasonable.
• 62% of respondents (35 people) indicated getting a breach penalty was of no help to them in avoiding further breach penalties. A majority 56%, (31 people) reported more than one breach. 14%, (8 people) reported receiving three or more breaches. This accords with the literature (ACOSS 2001b).
• 57% of respondents (32 people) felt they could not look any harder for work than they already were.
• 41% of respondents (23 people) indicated that, once breached, they needed to obtain assistance from family, another 15 people were helped by charities and 7 people indicated that their church was of help. Increasing rates of charity support need are in line with the literature (Horan 2001; Nevile 2001: 30).
• 21% of respondents (12 people) needed to move into less desirable accommodation.
Two 'stand-out' unexpected findings
Whilst the all of the findings of this survey have some importance for our understanding of the consequences of people receiving breach penalties, two specific findings stand out as surprising, and of concern.
Firstly, getting breached once does not work as an incentive, as the Government expected, to ensure compliance with compulsory administrative and activity requirements in order to avoid further breaches. More than half of the survey respondents received more than one breach penalty, with several reporting multiple breaches.
Secondly, if one does get breached, there is a significant risk that, as a consequence, there will be a need for that individual to move into less desirable accommodation than was previously enjoyed. This is a very important finding because it indicates that a serious consequence of being breached is that people's accommodation standards could be reduced, which was noted in the literature (ACOSS 2000: 2; 2001b; Nevile 2001 ), but could not be an ethical outcome.
However in this survey, 12 people out of 56 (almost 22%) reported needing to move into less desirable accommodation, an unexpectedly high proportion.
Three respondents wrote 'on the streets' and another reported moving to a 'men's homeless shelter'.
Although almost one quarter of all respondents had housing difficulty, at the Goodin (2001: 191) noted that same lack of choice about receiving welfare, arguing that obliging people to sign contractual activity agreements in return for welfare benefits lacked moral force. The notion 'agree or starve' (by losing benefit payment) was analogous to the highway robber's demand 'your money or your life!'
Conclusion
As noted earlier, the findings of this survey cannot be applied to outcomes for all people who have been breached or unemployed people who have not been
breached, yet the findings are largely consistent with the literature. However it is evident that the Howard Government's coercive Mutual Obligation breaching practices have not deterred more than half of the people surveyed in this Brisbane survey from being breached more than once. The breach penalty regime was designed in part to pressure people off welfare. The unemployed people surveyed could not be pressured off welfare, because they had no option other than to continue to claim welfare benefits. Both outcomes are contrary to Government expectation.
Of greatest concern was the larger than expected proportion of people who were breached, even for a first time, who then needed to move into less desirable accommodation, with four people reporting homelessness. This accommodation outcome confirms a need for further research into this area and provides evidence that breaching practices implemented under Mutual Obligation strike at the most vulnerable, least advantaged citizens.
The plight of the unemployed people identified in the survey presents a different picture of their life circumstances than that which Government rhetoric seeks to conjure. Prime Minister Howard boastfully proclaims the effectiveness of the Government's safety net, generously provided to 'protect' people who are 'genuinely in need' and deserving of welfare support (1999: 4).
